Negotiation has been a subject of central interest in DAI, proposed specially as a means for autonomous, self-interested agents to communicate and compromise in Multiagent Systems (Conry et al., 1988; Kraus, 1996; Kraus et al., 1995; Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994; Smith, 1980). However, the main focus of DAI research from a logical perspective has been that of \planning for multiple agents", which considers issues inherent in centrally directed multi-agent execution (George , 1983; George , 1984; George , 1986; Rao et al., 1992; Rosenschein, 1982) . We propose a logical framework to represent an incentive negotiation procotocol about task distribution in bilateral Multi-Agent Systems. We rst extend Bell's logic (Bell, 1995) to represent autonomous agents by adding utilities to his many-sorted rst-order modal logic, and then introduce a strategic model of negotiation that takes into consideration goal relationships. In so doing we represent not just a communication mechanism but the process through which two agents reason about what agreements to propose, accept or reject. The resultant protocol complies with the usual \fairness" criteria | e ciency, stability, symmetry, independence and invariance| under ceratin constraints such as no-historicity and instantaneously.
Introduction
The research in planning and agent architectures of the last decade has been focused on the transformation of single-agent, atemporal, static theories (Arti cial Intelligence, AI) into multi-agent, temporal, dynamically capable ones (Distributed Arti cial Intelligence, DAI). Researchers on agent interaction di er over the basic assumption of the degree of control that the designer has over individual agents and over the social environment (i.e., interaction mechanisms) to such an extent that DAI research has been split in two branches, namely that of distributed problem solving (DPS) and multi-agent (MA) systems.
The degree of control that a designer has over individual agents ranges from the case where a single designer is able to control (or even explicitly design) each individual agent in the domain (DPS), to the case where there are multiple designers and each is able to design only its agent and has no control over the internal design of other agents in the domain (MA systems).
The design of interaction protocols is also tightly coupled to the issue of agents' incentives. When agents are assumed centrally designed they are also assumed to have a common general goal. As long as agents have to coexist and cooperate in a single system, there is some notion of global utility that each agent is trying to maximize. So, in cooperative distributed problem solving, an agent might rationally make a decision that lowers its own utility for the global good. When agents are designed by di erent designers, they are usually assumed to have individual motivation to achieve their own goal and to maximize their own utility. Thus, no assumptions can be made about agents working together cooperatively. On the contrary, agents will cooperate only when they can bene t from that cooperation.
Therefore, research in DPS considers how work involved in solving a particular problem can be divided among a number of modules or \nodes", so it is improved system performance, scalability, modularity, and/or reliability. The central research issue in DPS is how to have these independent problem solvers work together coherently to solve the global problem, while maintaining acceptably low levels of inter-agent communication. MA researchers are also concerned with the coherence of interaction, but must build agents without having the luxury of designing their interaction opponents. The central research issue in MA is how to have these autonomous agents identify common ground for cooperation, and choose and perform coherent actions.
Since coherent action is central to both DPS and MA systems, the concept of \nego-tiation" has appeared throughout the DAI literature. DPS researchers see negotiation as an important mechanism for assigning task to local agents, resource allocation, and even for deciding which problem solving tasks to undertake. Negotiation is viewed as automated contracting: since all agents have a common goal and are designed to help one another (benevolence), there is no need to motivate an agent to compensate for tasks or to do its best in executing it. Nothwithstanding that, multi-agent planning is the most used DPS approach to cooperation: rather than risking incoherent and inconsistent decisions, multi-agent planning insists that nodes plan out beforehand exactly how each will act and interact. As the constraints imposed in DPS domains (such as complete knowledge and closed world) match up with classical, monotonic, logic, multi-agent planning has been fully formalized either as mere receipts (see, e.g., (George , 1986) ) or as complex mental states (\social plans" of (Rao et al., 1992) ), simply extending single-planning languages and techniques.
On the other hand, MA researchers have autonomous (and probably no-autosu cient) agents use negotiation to share the work associated with carrying out a joint plan (for the agents' mutual bene t), or to resolve outright con ict. In MA systems, agents typically make pairwise agreements through negotiation about how they will coordinate, and there is no global control, no globally consistent knowledge, and no globally shared goals or success criteria. So, the main purpose of this incentive contracting mechanism is to convince the \contractor" to agree to do the sub-task while choosing the e ort level preferred by the \manager". In this case, DAI researchers have followed the studies on bargaining with incomplete information developed in economics and game theory. For this reason the attention has been focused on probabilistic approaches quite distant from a logical perspective. Truth to tell, there is not a sole logical representation of negotiation.
However, in (Alonso, 1996; Alonso, 1997) a general protocol for representing bilateral incentive contracting for tasks distribution among autonomous agents was introduced using a second-order language. The space of deals was de ned in the set of pure deals, both individual rational and Pareto-optimal, and no assumptions were made about historicity or temporal discounts. The resulting protocol complied with the \fairness" criteria of e ciency, stability, independence, invariance and symmetry, but lacked the one of simplicity.
In this paper, we will employ a simple logic to represent a negotiation protocol and reduce the complexity of our previous model. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the second section, we describe the extended language for autonomous agents. The Rosenschein and Zlotkin's concept of utility is discussed in full and an enterely new \metric" is presented to characterize goals attending to their relationships. The third section contains the negotiation protocol.
Autonomous agent
Each agent is viewed as an independent entity with its own beliefs, goals, intentions, capabilities, and utility functions. We will use Bell's logic (Bell, 1995) to represent autonomous agents by adding utilities to his many-sorted rst-order modal logic. The reader is referred to that paper for the details of the formalism. In so doing, we ful l two important purposes: rst, we avoid the representational gap existing between the notion of autonomous agent and the \interaction module" that controls his interactions with other agents. That is specially important because, previous approaches that had represented social action considering non-individualistic notions such as joint intentions or social laws turned to use circular arguments. Secondly, appealing to preferred models (Shoham, 1988) agents are allowed to reason about the persistence of their beliefs and intentions. So, non-monotonicity is formalized eluding the rami cation problem.
Time
There is explicit reference to time points and intervals in the language. Time is taken to be composed of points and, for simplicity, is assumed to be discrete and linear; that is, time is assumed to be isomorphic to the integers. Temporal intervals are de ned as pairs of points.
Sintactically, if t; t 0 2 term T we de ne t < t 0 as the only temporal well-formed formula in our language. Other relations and functions on time points and intervals (t 1 = t 2 ,t 1 t 2 , i < e i 0 , i + 1 ,etc.) are de ned according to this formula. For example, two useful temporal formulas will be: otherwise, meaning that i + 1 is the interval which increments i, that is, the interval obtained by extending i by a time point. The language can be extended to de ne the usual tense operators \Since" and \Until": S('; ) t = def 9t 0 (t 0 < t^' t 0^8 t 00 (t 0 t 00 t ! t 00 )) U('; ) t = def 9t 0 (t < t 0^'t 0^8 t 00 (t t 00 t 0 ! t 00 ))
The formal semantics are a natural extension of the traditional Hintikka possibleworlds semantics. Therefore, M; w; g j = t < t 0 i (Vg(t); Vg(t 0 )) 2 r T , where r T T T .
We de ne a modal operator A ect so that a sentence ' i is a ected at an interval i if its truth value changes at i+1. We thus have the axiom A and, consequently, the persistence rule P.
Beliefs
We represent the beliefs with the modal operator Bel. Bel(x; ') i means that agent x believes ' at interval i, being our static logic of beliefs KD45 Bel . Agents do not have complete knowledge about either other agents' types or Nature's movements. Each one has an incomplete BB that revises and eventually updates when it gets new information.
Semantically, M; w; g j = Bel(x; ')(i) i M; w 0 ; g j = ' for all (w; w 0 ) 2 R (Bel;x;i;w) . The semantics of goals and intentions are de ned analogously by using the relations Goal and Int. The semantic constraint imposed on the belief, goal, and intention relation is that for each belief-accessible world there exists a subworld which is goal-accessible and, in turn, for each goal-accessible world there exists a sub-world which is intention-accessible. This semantic constraint is called \strong realism" (Rao and George , 1991) . The usual conditions of consistency are imposed on the accessibility relation: Each R (Bel;a;i;w) is serial, transitive and Euclidean.
Moreover, we have to adopt some axioms about the persistence and change (revision) of beliefs.
1. Belief in persistence (BP): If agent x believes that ' is true at i and x does not believe that ' is a ected at i, then x should believe that ' continues to be the case at i + 1.
Bel(x; ') i^: Bel(x; Aff(')) i ! Bel(x; ') i+1 .
Rules like BP are intended to be interpreted like Shoham's causal rules (Shoham, 1988 
Theorem 1 (Bell, 1995) : The logic KD45 B + A + BP + PB is consistent.
Hence we have a framework in which beliefs persist by default. In so doing we have provided solutions to mentalistic versions of the frame problem (BP) without invoking the corresponding versions of the rami cation problem. On the other hand, with (PB) we have opened the way for the agent to reason about its beliefs and to abandon them if it becomes irrational to continue holding them.
Moreover, agents mutually believe that each one is an utility maximizer, and that therefore will use strategies that give him the maximum utility. Mututal beliefs are easily introduced as follows: M ?Bel(x; y; ') E ?Bel(x; y; ')^E ? Bel(x; y; M ?Bel(x; y; ') ), where E ?Bel refers to \everybody believes".
Goals
Goals are de ned as desires (axiomatically characterized with K D ) which the agent believes are realisable: Goal(x; ')(i) = def Des(x; ') i^B el(x; 9x 0 ; e; i 0 (Does(x 0 ; e) i 0 ! ')). Then the axioms of persistence for desire are added.
As in (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994) goals are allowed to be relaxed so that agents can negotiate over what parts of their goals will be satis ed. Although each agent has its own xed goals, the outcome of the negotiation process may satisfy only partially the agents' goals.
Each goal has a worth, a value depending on the information available. Formally: S is the set of all possible world states, and for all x, W x : S ! N is the worth function of agent x. W x assigns some ( xed) value to each possible state of the world. Then W x (s n ) is an indication of how much of agent x's goal has been achieved, or how \close" state s n is to the achievement of x's whole goal. An agent x may have a set of distinct subgoals or tasks fG x g that he has to achieve. Each subgoal g k x worth is w k x . In this case, his overall goal is a conjunction of subgoals. Therefore, the worth function of one state s n might be de ned as
Now, we can measure the worth of any particular state relative to the worth of some state that fully satis es some particular goal g k x .
Assuming that the full achievement of g k x has an associate worth of w k x , we can de ne the worth function over a state s n to be the di erence between the worth of the goal and the distance from s n to the closest state that achieves it 1 .
The problem with this approach is that, at the end, the goal's worth is not de ned, since the full achievement of a goal has an arbitrary associated worth. Consequently, the de nition of utility is not completely justi ed and the outcomes of its application become rather bizarre as we will prove with the example of the subsection 2.6. The only idea suggested about goals worth is that the worth of a particular goal is the maximum the agent is disposed to \pay" in order to achieve it. But, what does it exactly mean? We think that the \importance" of a goal mainly depends on its relationships with another goals and/or subgoals of the agent. Rosenschein and Zlotkin's proposal, because it is that related to the principles established by game theory, relies its notion of rationality on instantaneous and separated decisions, without considering planning at all. In game theory, the agent chooses to perform the action that gives him the maximum utility each time, without considering before whether this action will be a ect his global plan (previously de ned to satisfy completely his goal in the best possible way). A \ lter" is necessary to avoid taking momentary maximizer decisions which could enter into con ict. This lter refers to goal-structure and planning.
We propose to analyze the relationships taking place among goals and/or subgoals and then \quantify" the worth of any goal with regard to its local and non-local e ects.
There are several taxonomies of goal relationships in DAI literature (Lesser et al., 1989; Lesser, 1991; Castelfranchi et al., 1992; Von Martial, 1992) , but only those linked to the FA/C (Functionally Accurate/Cooperative) model are useful. We could adopt instead whatever model which bases the signi cance of the goals on simple AND/OR trees. However appeling this approach is, it is di cult to see how relationships among goals located in di erent branches would be understood and computed: constraints exist not only vertically, but between the solutions of di erent goals even quite distant in the goal tree. In addition, the dependences occurring among di erent agents' goals could require some representational framework more expressive than distributed goal trees.
Broadly, the procedure we are still developing is as follows: The rst step consists in \qualifying" those relationships appearing among goals in a directed acyclic graph (DAG). We will consider two local-e ects, AND and OR |really meaning the usual task-subtask decomposition or re nement trees|, and, following (Lesser et al., 1989) , several non-local e ects, among others, subsumption, assistance, competition, cooperation, independence, sumbsumption ? inhibition and assistance ? inhibition.
Then the goals are \quanti ed" just adding and/or substracting the values assigned to each one of their associated e ects (to its original worth in the case of external vertices). Although few external vertices keep showing arbitrary values (and so do the e ects), the worth of the rest of the goals is now mechanically calculated from theirs, eliminating considerably the drawbacks displayed by other approaches.
In order to study this non-local e ects, let us introduce some notation and their de nitions citeLesser:1989.
De nition 1 potential solution set for a goal g : S(g) = fxjx is a potential solution of gg, where x is a potential solution of g if its characteristics lie within a range spe cied by g. S(g) de nes the space of all possible solutions of g. A speci c x 2 S(g) is only a potential solution since it may not be supported by low-level data or it may not be consistent with the solution to some other goal that interacts with g.
De nition 2 component set of a potential solution x: the set of partial results consistent with some subset of the characteristics of x, C s (x) = fyj8g; y 2 S(g) ! x 2 S(g)^x 6 = yg. y 2 C s (x) implies that the characteristics of y are a subset of the characteristics of x and, therefore, that y could possibly be used to derive x. subsumption: Goal g 1 subsumes a second goal g 2 , if the speci cations of g 2 are completely encompassed by the speci cations of g 1 . Formally, subsumes(g 1 ; g 2 ) 8y; y 2 S(g 2 ) ! 9w s.t. y 2 C s (w)^w 2 S(g 1 ). assistance: One goal, g 1 , is said to assist another goal, g 2 , if satisfaction of g 1 implies satisfaction of g 2 . The assistance relationship identi es those goals that represent alternative approaches to generating a particular solution.
assists(g 1 ; g 2 ) 8w; w 2 S(g 1 ) ! 9y s.t. y 2 C s (w)^y 2 S(g 2 ). competition: Two goals, g 1 and g 2 , are competing if there is no possible partial solution that will satisfy both goals. competing(g 1 ; g 2 ) 8w8y; w 2 S(g 1 )^y 2 S(g 2 ) ! :(9g f 9W9Y s.t. fW; Y g S(g f ), W and Y can be simultaneously acceptable solutions and w 2 C s (W )^y 2 C s (Y )). cooperation: Two goals are cooperating if it is possible for the goals to produce information that may be incorporated into a single result at some point in the future. cooperating(g 1 ; g 2 ) 8w8y; w 2 S(g 1 )^y 2 S(g 2 ) ! 9g f 9x s.t. x 2 S(g f )^fw; yg C s (x). independence: Two goals are independent if they are not competing and if it is not possible for them to be incorporated into a single result at some point in the future. independents(g 1 ; g 2 ) 8w8y; w 2 S(g 1 )^y 2 S(g 2 ) ! :(9g f 9x s.t. x 2 S(g f )^fx; yg C s (x)). subsumption-inhibition: A new type of goal, called an \inhibiting-goal", has been added to identify redundant work that can be eliminated. Goal g 1 inhibits a second goal g 2 , if g 1 is an inhibiting goal and g 1 subsumes g 2 . assistance-inhibition: Goal g 1 partially inhibits goal g 2 if g 1 is an inhibiting goal and g 1 assits g 2 . The assistance-inhibition relation limits work to those areas of g 2 not encompassed by g 1 . Now, we will see an example of how to \quantify" and compute a particular kind of non-local e ect in which a goal subsumes other(s):
For example, if there is a vertice g 5 for which achievement two other nodes g 2 and g 3 , with worth 2:5 and 3:5 respectively, have to be accomplished earlier (AND e ect), then w(g 5 ) = w (g 2 ) + w (g 3 ) = 6. At the same time, the part of the goal worth related to its OR relationships will we computed just as the maximum of the worths of the goals OR-related to it.
Let us consider a non-local e ect, subsumption. Then the part of the g k x 's worth corresponding to its enabling relationships will be speci ed through the formula 1 2 P (w (g l ) :
subsumes(g k ; g l )). Notice that transitivity is easily computed: if subsumes(g 1 ; g 2 ), subsumes(g 2 ; g 3 ), and w(g 1 ) = 6, w(g 2 ) = 4 and w(g 3 ) = 2, then w (g 3 ) = w(g 3 ) = 2, w (g 2 ) = 4 + ( 1 2 :2) = 5 and w (g 1 ) = 6 + ( 1 2 :5) = 8:5. Moreover, in order to outweigh uniqueness we can divide this value among the mean of all the goals (including g k ) that a ect non-locally g l . In general, the worth of a goal g k will be w (g k ) = X (w (g l ) : AND(g k ; g l )) + max w (g l ) : OR(g k ; g l ) + P (w (g l ) : non ? local(g k ; g l )) jg ll j : non ? local(g ll ; g l ) ; (3) where is the value assigned to the e ect under consideration. If we think of an external vertex, the formula will we w (g k ) = w(g k ) + X (w(g l ) : non ? local(g k ; g l )):
The interesting thing is that this procedure generates an order of preference among the goals (e.g., g 3 < g 2 < g 1 ). Moreover, we can say in each case how much worthy is one goal g k with regard to another g l . For example, g 1 is preferible to g 3 in degree 3:5, which is expressed with the formula g 3 E g 1 = 3:5. Therefore, agents are endowed with a method for knowing the worth of their goals and, consequently, classi cating them.
Of course, several constraints have to be observed, among others:
Constraint 1 If non ? local(g k ; g l ) and depth(g k ) depth(g l ), then w (g k ) < w (g l ).
Even though the rst goal increments its worth a ecting the execution of g l , it is not intuitive to assign greater value to a goal which is farther from the nal (and allegedly preferred) goal. However, notice that we do not impose arti cial degrees to each path. Moreover, as a direct consequence, we reduce the arbitrariness in the external vertices' worth to well-de ned ranks. For example, if subsumes(g k ; g l ), w (g l ) = 8 and depth(g k ) = depth(g l ), then w (g k ) = w(g k ) + 1 2 :8; given the above constraint w (g k ) = (w(g k ) + 4) < 8 = 1; 3]. Constraint 2 8g k 2 DAG; w (g k ) > 0.
That is, no contradictory values are allowed. In the preceding example, if w (g l ) = 4, then w (g k ) = 0; 1]. Imagine that AND(g k ; g k 0 ) and AND(g k ; g k 00 ), so that if we refer to g k 0 's worth, w (g k 0 ) = 0 could be the case. The thing is that is quite bizarre to assign value 0 (or even negative ones) to goals. Just suppose that AND(g k 0 ; g k 000 ) and AND(g k 0 ; g k 0000 ). Which values will these last goals take?
Of course, this formula must be extended to cope with exterior e ects, those taking place between goals of di erent agents. In principle, the underlying idea |and subsequent logical form| is the same for both non-local and exterior e ects. If agent x's goal g k x , for example, subsumes g k 0 y , the original worth of the rst should be increased in proportion to the worth of the second one. This added value will mean the \importance" of g k x in the negotiation process. Notice, however, that this exterior e ect could be cancelled if there are in DAG y \parallel" non-local e ects. So, the worth of g k x will increase its value from exterior e ects such as subsumes unless this relationship will appear in agent y's DAG (or another one that subsumes it).
In another dimension we consider the \similitude" among di erent agents' nal goals in order to determine which negotiation situations they are involved in.
When a goal is really identical in both agents' minds, versus when refers to parallel world states, in all identical except for being pertinent to di erent particular agents. For instance, if both agents have the goal to have spaghetti cooked, their goals are indeed identical (IGs); but if both i and j have the goal to eat spaghetti (i.e., i has the goal that i eats spaghetti while j has the goal that j eats spaghetti), they have parallel goals (PGs).
PGs must be kept distinct from IGs, in that they may imply relevant di ering consequences in social interactions and relationships. In fact, PGs are likely to give rise to competition in given conditions (scarcity of resouces), or when the goals in question are de ned in intrinsically exclusive terms (\I want to be the one who eats spaghetti"). On the other hand, IGs are the seed of cooperative attitudes.
So, following (Castelfranchi et al., 1992) , we will discriminate between mutual and reciprocal relationships. The rts type refers to situations in which both agents depend on each other about IGs, and the second one to those situations in which both agents depend on each other about di erent non-con ictive goals. We are not interested in con ict situations (in which no agreement is possible), we will not deal with competitive goals. However, competitive situations derived from zero-sum games are fully covered in our framework.
Intentions
The logic of intention will be KD I plus the persistence axioms, and the following:
1. Int(x; ') i ! :Int(x; :') i , 2. Int(x; ') i ! Goal(x; ') i , 3. Int(x; ') i ! Bel(x; Int(a; ')) i .
Notice that instead of formalizing intentions as persistent goals (Cohen and Levesque, 1990) , we allow agents to reason about their intentions. This rationality will be understood in terms of utility. The problem with Cohen and Levesque's approach is that of the rami cation: They have to specify all the disqualifying conditions in which the goal is allowed to be dropped. Otherwise, the agent's commitment persists as long as its initial reasons for adopting the goal do; no matter how unreasonable it is to continue to pursuit it.
Utility
Each agent has its own utility function, so it has a preference partial ordering according to its actual beliefs, goals and intentions. Agents are viewed as utility maximizers, that is, the rationality of a behaviour is understood with regard to its utility in the scale of preferences.
The utility of one state of the world s n for an agent x is the value assigned by the following formula: utility x (s n ) = (W x (s n ) ? cost x (s 0 ; s n )); (5) where s 0 is the initial state of the world, and cost(s 0 ; s n ) is equal to the number of actions to be executed to bring the world from s 0 to s n according to the minimal stand-alone plan (or those actions the agent has agreed to execute as part of a deal). Therefore, utility will be viewed as a function from worlds into the integers. Notice that when (5) is applied we have to consider the distance between two states used in formula (2) as the cost involved in bringing the world from the rst state to the second one.
As we cannot detach the utility of one state from the plan (or deal) the agent has to execute to achieve his goal, we will identify s f 's utility with the utility of its associated plan, . For an agent, the utility of a pure deal, , will be the di erence between the worth of the state of the world in which the deal ends and the expected work to which the deal commits him. utility x ( ) = (W x (s n ) ? cost x ( )) (6) Of course, this formula assumes that cost x ( ) is \rational", that is, computing the cost of a deal is not a separated calculus but it is only performed taking into account the place that the referred deal takes in the agent's goal structure.
Example of utilities
In order to understand the advantages of our approach, let us reproduce the following example by (Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1996) .
Let the initial state of the world, s 0 , be the following: \The black box is alone at slot 1, the white block is alone at slot 2, the grey box is alone at slot 3, and the slot 4 is clear". Agent x has two subgoals: g 1 x is \The black box is clear at slot 2, but not on the table" and g 2 x is \The white box is alone at slot 3". The worth of the two subgoals is w 1 x = 4 and w 2 x = 6. If i were alone in the world, he could bring the world to one of the stand-alone optimal states:
1. s 1 , meaning \The grey box is alone at slot 3, the white box is at slot 2, and the black box is on the white box"; 2. s 2 , meaning \The grey box is alone at slot 4, the white box is alone at slot 3, and the black box is alone at slot 1"; 3. s 3 , meaning \The white box is alone at slot 3, the grey box is at slot 2, and the black box is on the grey box". Agent x is inde erent among s 1 , s 2 and s 3 , because in all cases his utility is 2. They are all stand-alone optimal states, as can be seen below: s 1 j = g 1 x , therefore W x (s 1 ) = 4. c(s 0 ; s 1 ) = 2, because x has to execute just two actions to bring the world from s 0 to s 1 , namely, \x lifts the black box" and \x puts the black box on the white box". Therefore, the utility of agent x from s 1 is (4-2)=2. s 2 j = g 2 x , therefore W x (s 2 ) = 6. c(s 0 ; s 2 ) = 4, because x has to execute just four actions to move the grey box from slot 3 to slot 4, and the white box from slot 2 to slot 3. Therefore, the utility of agent x from s 2 is (6-4)=2.
x , therefore W x (s 3 ) = 6 + 4 = 10. c(s 0 ; s 3 ) = 8, therefore, the utility of agent x from s 3 is (10-8)=2. In order to avoid indi erence among several states (even though one of them fully satis es his goal and the others only partially), Rosenschein and Zlotkin agents penalize (negative utility) from unachieved goals. Let p k x be the penalty that agent x gets when his subgoal g k x is not achieved. They then de ne the worth function to be
Therefore, in the previous example, agent x prefers s 3 over s 2 and s 1 .
We think that this approach to states' utility is wrong in two senses:
(1) Although it costs the agent 12 to bring the world from s 1 to s f , whereas bringing the world from s 2 to s f , will cost 6, s 1 and s 2 have the same utility in this model. The problem is that Rosenschein and Zlotkin do introduce in the utility formula the cost of bringing the world from the initial state s 0 to the state considered, without calculating the cost of bringing the world from this state to s f as it is established in formula (2). Then, how can agent x choose between s 1 and s 2 in their model? Simply, he cannot, although s 2 is clearly preferable to s 1 . Realizing this problem, they appeal to penalties, an ad hoc procedure. A complete analisys of goals worth, like ours, is needed to avoid this problems.
(2) On the other hand, Zlotkin and Rosenschein's model allows absolutely arbitrary worths and, consequently, bizarre outcomes might appear computing utilities. In their model the following case is allowed to occur: If we consider the states of the world that satisfy two consecutive goals g k and g l , say s n and s m , and assume that the general cost of carrying the world from s 0 to s f through these states is the same, then the utility of the state satisfying g k could be greater than the utility of the state satisfying g l , if w(g k ) > w(g l ). Therefore, the agent will prefer to be in the rst state rather than in the second one even though this does not make sense: Following this argument, the agent will never act, given that s 0 could have the greatest associated worth.
You will say that this result comes from the fact that we presuppose that there is an subsumption relationship between two consecutive states, but that this is not the case in Rosenschein's and Zlotkin's model. That is not fully true: even though Zlotkin and Rosenschein do not study goal relationships, they exist.
Once we have described and formalized the internal structure of the agents we are interested in, the protocol through which they will interact must be presented with this underlying logic. That is quite important because we are going to formalize not just the negotiation process viewed as a mere \external" communication protocol but the behaviour of any autonomous agent bargaining under certain constraints. For simplicity, we will represent the negotiation mechanism in terms of agents' goals and beliefs, taking the goal-intention relationship for granted.
Negotiation Mechanism
Broadly speaking, the negotiation process has been de ned as the process of identifying potential interactions through communication or by reasoning about the current states and intentions of other agents and modifying the intentions of these agents to avoid harmful interactions or create cooperative situations. For this idea to be applicable, few assumptions are considered depending on the agents we are dealing with and the results we are looking for.
Initial assumptions
The more important ones are:
1. Task oriented domains: The agreement point is about tasks distribution, not about resource allocation. We are interested in determining who has to perform a particular task not in deciding how to \share the pie".
2. Only pure deals. Although mixed deals enlarge the agreement space allowing probabilistic distribution over the tasks even in con ictive situations (semi-cooperative and multi-plan deals), we do not assume symmetric capabilities. However interesting this approach is, agents may be not autosu cient when MA systems are considered. That means that, for one agent, the set of actions required to be executed to satisfy its goal are not necessarily a subset of the set of its capabilities. Not surprisingly, the most interesting cases of negotiation arise when agents need each other to satisfy their goals.
3. There are not either time constant discount rates or constant costs of delay (e.g, (Kraus et al., 1995) ). Neither agent is under time pressure. 4. Bilateral Negotiation: In a multiagent encounter, negotiation is done between a pair of agents at a time. 5. Binding Commitments: If an agreement is reached both sides will honor it. 6. Honesty: Although agents are free-riders 2 , they are supposed to be honest. For example, no agent can propose to do an action which it is enable to execute. 7. No History: There is no consideration given by the agents to the past or future; each negotiation stands alone. 8. Independence: Despite di erent agents are able to perform di erent operations in the world, the cost of each operation and the worth of the goals are independent of the agent being considered. 9. Common Knowledge: Assumptions 1-8 are common knowledge.
Attributes of the negotiation mechanism
Usually, the following attributes are demanded. Our model comply with all of them except, perhaps, with the fth.
1. E ciency: For example, it makes sense for the agreements to satisfy the requirement of Pareto Optimality instead of the Global Optimality. The rst refers to the product of agents' utilities, whereas global optimality is considered just as their addition. Allegedly, under this constraint, the protocol shoul be \fairer" because neither agent would propose an agreement giving low utility (e.g., zero) to the other. Although everybody recognizes that this constraint is only acceptable in terms of global e ciency, it appears to be indispensable to guarantee \fair" agreements. 2. Stability: No agent should have an incentive to deviate from agreed-upon strategies (strategies in equilibrium). Once strategy s is adopted, under the assumption that agent x uses s, agent y cannot do better by using a strategy that is di erent than s. This attribute is specially important: when we are working in MA systems, even though there is a full control over the agent interaction mechanism by bounding the agents to highly structured public behaviour, there is no control over the agent's private behaviour. This gap is bridged by carefully adjusting the interaction mechanism such that it will be stable. Using a stable mechanism, it is to the bene t of each individual agent (that wishes to maximize its own private utility) to adopt a given private behaviour. When those private behaviours are in equilibrium, then the designers of the interaction protocols can assume that the individual agents will be designed to have those private behaviours even though the protocol's designer have no explicit control. 3. Instantaneously: Con ict should be resolved without delay, and agreements must be executed inmediately. 4. Con ict avoidance: only cooperative and compromise situations are considered.
However, we allow zero-sum games (what one player gains, another player must lose) when identical or complementary goals are taken into consideration. 5. Simplicity: The overall interaction environment should make low computational demands on the agents, and involve little communication overhead. 6. Distribution: The interaction rules should not require a central decision maker. 7. Symmetry: The coordination mechanism should not treat agents di erently because of non-relevant attributes. The relevant attributes are the agents' utility functions and their role in the encounter.
Evaluation criteria
A negotiation mechanism should have a \fair" solution to a bargaining situation. 1. Individual rationality: It would not be fair for a participant to get less than he would anyway without an agreement. 2. Pareto optimality: A state of a airs w is Pareto-optimal if there is no way of making any person better o than he is in w which does not make someone else worse o . Given the value judgements of Paretian welfare economics, there is a clear sense in which a Pareto-sub-optimal state of a airs is undesirable: for every such state of a airs, there exists a feasible alternative which is clearly better. Notice, however, that this does not imply that all Pareto-optimal states of a airs are better than all Pareto-sub-optimal ones. For example, imagine an economy in which the only economic problem is to divide 100 units of consumption between two individuals, A and B. Assume that each individual cares only about his own consumption. Then the set of Pareto-optimal outcomes contains all those outcomes in which A's and B's consumptions sums to 100. The outcome (100,0) in which A consumes 100 units and B consumes nothing, is Pareto-optimal, just as (50,50) is. The outcome (49,49) is Pareto-sub-optimal. Paretian welfare economics tells us that (49,49) is undesirable, but only because is clearly inferior to other feasible outcomes such (50,50). It does not tell us that (49,49) is inferior to (100,0), even though the latter is Pareto-optimal and the former is not 3 .
In order to avoid as far as possible this drawback, we introduce the following criterion of symmetry. 3. Symmetry: If the situation is symmetric, that is, if both agents would get the same utility without an agreement, and for every possible deal, the symmetric deal is also possible, then a fair solution should also be symmetric, i.e., give both participants the same utility. 4. Invariance with respect to linear utility transformations. As an example, imagine two agents negotiating over how to divide 100 pounds. If one agent measures his utility in quids while the other measures his in pence, it should not in uence the fair solution. 5. Independence of irrelevant alternatives. Imagine two agents negotiating about how to divide 10,000 pence. The Nash solution will be 5,000 cents for each, due to the symmetry assumption above. Now imagine that the same agents are negotiating over 100 pounds. Even though there are now some deals that they cannot reach (for example, the one where one agent gets 49.99 pounds, and the other gets 50.01 pounds), the solution should be the same, because the original solution of 5,000 cents can still be found in the new deal space. As Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994) , we consider deals and mechanisms that maximize the product (not the sum) of agents' utilities, because Nash (1950 showed that the product maximizing solution not only satis es the above criteria, but it is the only solution that satis es them.
Negotiation set
To what kind of agreement can agents come? As we have said above (2nd assumption), we restrict our model to pure deals. A pure deal is an ordered pair (a 1 ; a 2 ), in which a i is the agent i's part of the plan, although deals can also be viewed as commitments, such as are presented in (Alonso, 1996) .
The set of all pure deals that are individual-rational and pareto-optimal is called the negotiation set (NS):
1. Deal i \dominates" deal j , i j , if i is better for at least one agent and not worse for the other. Neither agent prefers j over i , but at least one of the agents prefers i over j . 2. A deal i is \individual rational" if it gives both agents non-negative utility, that is, if i , the con ict deal. It would not be fair for a participant to get less than he would anyway without an agreement (less than his best alternative to the negotiated agreement (BATNA)). 3. A deal i is \pareto optimal" if there does not exist another deal that dominates it, that is, if there does not exist another deal j such that j i . A pareto optimal deal cannot be improved upon for one agent without lowering the other agent's utility from the deal.
Strategies and Protocol
1. Intuitively, a negotiation strategy is a function from the history of the negotiation to the current o er that is consistent with the protocol. It speci es precisely how an agent will continue (what move it will make) given a speci c protocol, and the negotiation up to this point according to his system of beliefs.
Formally, the strategy of an agent x is a sequence of functions f = ff t g 1 t=0 . The domain of the ith element of a strategy is a sequence of o ers of lenght i (all possible histories up to period i) and its range is the set fYes; Nog NS (its current move).
That is, if f is the strategy for the rst agent to make an o er (agent 1) then f 0 2 NS and for t even f t : NS t ! NS and for t odd f t : NS t+1 ! fYes; Nog (NS t is the set of all sequences of length t of elements of NS). We denote by F the set of all strategies of an agent which starts the bargaining. Similarly, let G be the set of all strategies of the agent which, in the rst move, has to respond to the other agent's o er; that is, G is the set of all sequences of functions g = fg t g 1 t=0 such that for t even g t : NS t+1 ! fYes; Nog and for t odd g t : NS t ! NS.
There are no rules which bind agents to any speci c strategy. However, whatever the strategy selected, both agents use it. And this is common knowledge.
2. Negotiation is a process through which in each temporal point t 2 N one agent, say
x, proposes an agreement from the negotiation set NS, and the other agent (y) either accepts (Yes) the o er or does not. If the o er is accepted, then the negotiation ends with implementation of the agreement. Otherwise, the second agent then has to make a countero er or to reject x's o er and abandon the process (No). We allow agents to stand still, that is, to propose repeatedly the same deal, and even to backtrack. The process ends when an agreement is reached (one agent accepts the other's proposal), both agents stand still in the same round, or one of them abandon the process. In the last two cases there is no agreement and con ict arises. Rejects(x; Offers(y; x; i ) t ) t+1 8 j (Bel(x; (utility x ( ) > utility x ( j )) t+1 ): Agent x will accept the o er if he believes that there is no other deal in NS that gives him more utility:
Accepts(x; Offers(y; x; i ) t ) t+1 8 j (Bel(x; (utility x ( i ) > utility x ( j )) t+1 ): Then, obviously, Offers(y; x; i ) t 8 j (Bel(y; utility y ( i ) > utility y ( j )) t ):
Finally, Agreement(x; y; i ) t+1 Accepts(x; Offers(y; x; i ) t ) t+1 , where Offers(x; y; i ) iif Proposes(x; y; a i )^Requests(x; y; a j );
Proposes(x; y; a i ) iif (Bel(x; NEC(y; x; a i ; ')) _ (Bel(x; W ? DEP(y; x; a i ; ')), and Requests(x; y; a j ) iif (Bel(x; NEC(x; y; a j ; )) _ (Bel(x; W ? DEP(x; y; a j ; )).
To see what these formulae mean, the following analysis of dependence relationships is necessary:
1. Social dependence: x socially depends on y with regard to an act a i useful for achieving a goal ' if (a) ' is a goal of x, x is not able to realize ' while y is, and there exists at least one agreement in the negotiation set by which x achieves ', or (b) ' is a goal of x, and x is able to realize ' but prefers to satisfy the goal by an agreement rather than alone. Formally,
Conclusions and further work
In this report we extend the logical framework for the representation of negotiation protocols introduced in (Alonso, 1996; Alonso, 1997) in two ways: rst, we modify Bell's logic to allow autonomous agents to reason about their beliefs and intentions in terms of utility and link the resultant logic with the one representing the negotiation mechanism; then we propose a \metric" for evaluating the importance of their goals, the states of the world satisfying them and the actions (plans) needed to bring the world to these states. In so doing we improve previous approaches (Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1996) and make all the process \mechanical". However, there are some points to develop:
1. Identify Frame-strategies to avoid complexity: As Kraus et al. (1995) pointed out, one of the major problems of contracting mechanisms like ours is their complexity. There is no single mechanical algorithm for equilibrium strategies (the maximization approach avoids this problem using linear programming techniques): the researcher makes a guess that some strategy combination is in equilibrium and then checks to see that it is so. In general, it is too time consuming to compute strategies in real time. Therefore, we suggest that equilibrium strategies be identi ed for varied situations before the negotiation process starts. Firstly, we should characterize situations by several environmental factors (\ ag" of the opponent, purpose of the negotiation, etc.). Secondly, we build agents with a library of di erent frame-strategies suitable for the situations the negotiator may participate in. When the negotiator acts in one of these situations it will choose the frame-strategy that is adapted for the current situation, initialize the appropiate variables and negotiate according to this strategy.
2. Learning: However, because agents are active in a dynamic environment, these frames cannot be precomputed by their respective designer an inserted into each agent's database. We need to provide the agents with \delayed reinforcement learning" mechanisms. The idea is to reinforce strategies depending on their \degree of success" (how close the outcome is to agent's maximizer strategy). Each time the agent faces a new encounter he will choose the more reinforced strategy from the library of meta-strategies. In turn, the nal result will make the agent update and eventually revise this library. This will allow to apply the model not just to one-shot games but also to repeated games and multiple encounters. Nevertheless, the assumption of no-historicity must be dropped out previously.
3. New equilibria, new logic: Although our logical framework represents uncertainty, given the restrictive assumptions and constraints we imposed in the negotiation protocol (Alonso, 1996; Alonso, 1997) , its successful application is limited to perfect information games. Dealing with pure deals, these are the only games presenting a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. However, if we extend the model following the rst two described stages, new | mixed| deals (semi-cooperative deals, multi-plan deals) and situations (agents can cooperate even in con ictive conditions) will arise demanding other equilibria (e.g., trembling hand perfectness, perfect bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium).
The point now is if the until now used logical model could be used to represent the new concepts and techniques linked to the extension of the model. First we will study the e ects of possibilistic logics in the representation of actions and negotiation protocols (e.g., extending (Haddawy, 1991) ), and then consider the possibility of translating the resultant logic into the original modal framework following (Haddawy and Frisch, 1990 ). 4. Real Multi-Agent Systems: Finally, we also will extend the framework to deal with multiple agents (studying new phenomena, such as alliances and conventions, and new roles, such as mediators and arbiters). Social structures such as groups and organizations will be taken into consideration. There are two ways of viewing systems of multiple agents: DPS sees systems in a top-down manner, that is, a \controller" chooses the more quali ed agents to execute a pre-existing plan: Agents do not take part in the formation or development of the system. On the other hand, MA researchers see systems in a bottom-up way: here, the important thing is to understand how self-interested agents commit themselves to long-term agreements, and how these treaties are preserved or abandoned.
